Chapter 12 Social Media Incitement to Genocide by Łubiński, Piotr
The Concept of Genocide in 
International Criminal Law 
 
Developments after Lemkin 
 
Edited by Marco Odello and 
Piotr Łubiński 
 
First published 2015 
 
ISBN: 978-0-415-72126-4 (hbk) 
ISBN: 978-0-415-72128-8 (pbk) 






Social media incitement to genocide 














We can observe a revolution in communication within the last decade. One
of the most significant aspects of it is the phenomenon of social media. Social
media has become an excellent channel to mobilize support, disseminate nar-
ratives, wage information operations, or even coordinate military operations
in the real world,1 and has become one of the most powerful tools for coord-
inating nearly all of the world’s political movements. The content on social
media can be distributed by means and methods which avoid control or cen-
sorship, or even quality control. This leads to an increasing number of prob-
lems related to its mass use, particularly in cases when it is used to fuel social
unrest. There is no recent or ongoing conflict which is not partly at least
a result of the mass use of social media. The “Arab Spring”, or the more cur-
rent “Mouvement des gilets” in France, were powered by the use of social
media to organize a massive group of protesters. As a result, larger, more
loosely connected groups could conduct coordinated actions that were previ-
ously reserved for formal organizations.2 Social media has also been used to
support military operations.3
An intrinsic element of the mass use of social media is its vulnerability to
manipulation(s). These popular movements are difficult to control, in particu-
lar with respect to ensuring that the content distributed amongst followers on
the internet is accurate.4 In recent years social media has not only become
a channel for social unrest and data manipulation, but also constitutes a useful
channel for spreading hate speech that may amount to behaviour known in the
1 Beata Biały, Social Media: From Social Exchange to Battlefield, Cyber Defense Review, Vol.
2(2) (Summer 2017), p. 75.
2 Clay Shirky, The Political Power of Social Media Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political
Change, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, 2011, p. 35.
3 Biały, p. 75.
4 Matthew Mastromauro, Pre-trial Prejudice 2.0: How YouTube Generated News Coverage Is
Set to Complicate the Concepts of Pre-trial Prejudice Doctrine and Endanger Sixth Amend-
ment Fair Trial Rights, Journal of High Technology Law, Vol. 289, 2010, p. 291.
legal doctrine as “incitement to genocide”. Within the last few years there
have been at least two widely discussed examples of using social media with
genocidal intent. The first was the case of ISIS and the Yazidi, and the second
the case of the Rohingya population in Myanmar.
This article analyses the use of social media by ISIS (or Daesh) against the
Yazidi population. In the Yazidi case I try to address the more general ques-
tion of whether social media activity may, under certain circumstances, fall
within the scope of incitement to genocide. This general issue is separated
into several elements. It begins by presenting the scale and nature of ISIS
activity in social media. Next, overlapping notions and legal regulations are
examined, bearing in mind, for example, that the same content may consti-
tute hate speech, incitement to terrorism, and/or incitement to genocide.
Subsequently, some concepts in the jurisprudence on incitement will be
applied to the new media, particularly from the perspective of the media
cases adjudicated by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as
well as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
Finally, the question of the criminal responsibility of persons engaged in
ISIS’s social media activities will be addressed, with particular attention to the
internet genocide inciters supporting ISIS cause in European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) countries.
Prevention of genocide: the legal framework
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide of 1948 (Genocide Convention) provides in Article 1 for general obliga-
tions on state parties, declaring that “genocide, whether committed in time
of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they
undertake to prevent and to punish”. It creates the hostis humani generi
character of the crime. It was also confirmed by the ICTR in the case of
Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga that universal jurisdiction exists for the crime of
genocide. Thus the Convention puts on all state parties a legal obligation to
combat genocide in all possible forms. Article 2 defines genocide as:
[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a)
Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.
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In August 2014 the Yazidi population suffered from acts proscribed by points
(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of Article 2.5
The main question addressed in this chapter is: which acts referred to in Art-
icle 2 are punishable? Should just physical extermination be punished? Or
should other forms – including incitement to genocide as foreseen in the Article
3 (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide6 – which are conducted
and executed in the social media realm be punishable? This issue raises import-
ant questions as to whether mere social media activity can be considered as acts
prohibited by international law, especially taking into consideration the nature
and scale of the ISIS internet operation.
Incitement to commit genocide: general remarks
Lemkin’s views on incitement and propaganda
When creating the concept of genocide, Raphael Lemkin was fully aware of the
notion of incitement. As Irvin-Erickson has noted in his excellent book on
Lemkin, in 1932 in the early years of his career Lemkin was collaborating with
Professor Emil Rappaport on a new Polish criminal code. Lemkin was an author
of, inter alia, Article 113, which criminalized incitement to aggressive war. His
position corresponds with a 1927 Hersch Lauterpacht essay declaring that pro-
hibitions on propaganda to incite war could be enshrined in national laws. In
his further elaborations Irvin-Erickson mistakenly states that the Lemkin legacy
led to the first criminal code which outlawed propaganda to incite violence.7 It
only outlawed incitement to wage an aggressive war.
Lemkin was bitterly aware of the nature of hateful propaganda. It was during
the time of the Madrid conference in 1933 that Ukrainians were facing
a Soviet-induced Holodomor (great famine; see Chapter 2). In his article
“Soviet genocide in the Ukraine”, published in 1953, Lemkin stated in a very
direct way that genocide had taken place there. He was also greatly aware of the
nature of Nazi propaganda at the time of the Holodomor. Later, his ideas were
presented in the trials held by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
in 1946. The sentencing of Der Stürmer editor Julius Streicher and Hans
Fritzsche, Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, showed to
the world the true nature of Goebbels’ Nazi propaganda, with its hateful incite-
ment of Germans to actively persecute and murder their Jewish neighbours.
5 Human Rights Council Report, Thirty-Second Session on Human Rights Situations That
Require the Council’s Attention, “They came to destroy”: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis, A/
HRC/32/CRP.2, 15 June 2016, pp. 21–28.
6 1948 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for
signature 9 December 1948, Art. II, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 January 1951).
7 Douglas Irvin-Erickson, Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide, University of Pennsylva-
nia Press, 2017, p. 41 (footnote 3).
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Lemkin’s approach is reflected in Article 3 of the Genocide Convention,
which prohibits direct and public incitement to genocide as well as all forms of
complicity.8 In order to maintain the preventive character of the prohibition of
genocide, this inchoate crime concept – i.e. of direct and public incitement –
became a punishable offence.9
Incitement to genocide and freedom of speech under international
criminal tribunals and the ECHR
When discussing the issue of incitement in the new media age one may argue
that it is protected by freedom of speech and that everything is blurred and it is
very difficult to govern, and that for the sake of protecting a cornerstone of
democracy, we should take a more lenient approach.
Freedom of speech is indeed truly one of the most fundamental rights in
a democratic society. However, it is not unlimited. A lack of limits on freedom of
speech easily leads to violation of the rights of others. Freedom of speech has been
meticulously shaped by international law and courts. The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights provides that “Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited
by law” and “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”10
Similar language is used in the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Article 4(a) declares that state parties
[s]hall declare as an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas
based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as
well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or
group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin and the provision of
any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof.
The European Convention of Human Rights also protects freedom of expression.
In the Handyside case the Court, then referred to as “the Commission”, explained
righteously that this right may be “favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or
as a matter of indifference, but also […] those that offend, shock or disturb”.11 But
freedom of expression is not unlimited. Article 10.2 of the ECHR provides that
8 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, United Nations,
Treaty Series, Vol. 78, p. 277. https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%
2078/volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf/
9 William Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006 p.181
10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 999 UNTS 171, (1966) 6 ILM
368; available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-
999-i-14668-english.pdf.
11 Handyside v UK (1976) Series A No 24, para 49.
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the exercise of these freedoms […] may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society, […] for the prevention of disorder or
crime.12
In this regard two values must be balanced: freedom of speech and the preven-
tion of genocide as broadly construed. The prevention of genocide, or specific-
ally the exclusion of incitement to genocide from the protections of freedom of
speech, should be interpreted in conjunction with Article 17 of the ECHR,
which says that groups and individuals should not “engage in any activity or
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set
forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the
Convention”. The Court has applied Article 17 in cases of Holocaust revision-
ism and forms of anti-Semitism.13
The ECtHR has several times strongly opposed incitement to violence. In
Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany, the ECtHR referred to the ban on activ-
ities of an Islamist association for advocating the use of violence (active jihad,
suicide attacks in Israel) in order to destroy Israel. The association was calling
for the banishment or killing of Israeli inhabitants and for the overthrow of the
governments of the Israeli state. In the Court’s view, the association’s approach,
by “employing this right for ends which are clearly contrary to the values of the
Convention, notably the commitment to the peaceful settlement of international
conflicts and to the sanctity of human life”14 was not nor should be protected
by the Convention.
The Court’s finding was confirmed in the case of Kasymakhunov and Sayba-
talov v. Russia.15 The applicant was convicted for spreading the ideology of
Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, banned as a terrorist organisation in Russia, and for
12 Article 10 reads in full: “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without inter-
ference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these
freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic soci-
ety, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for main-
taining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” Council of Europe, European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11
and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5, available at: www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention
_ENG.pdf [accessed 11 July 2019].
13 Antoine Buyse, Dangerous Expressions: The ECHR, Violence and Free Speech, Inter-
national and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 63(2), April 2014, p. 494.
14 Case of Hizb Ut-Tahrir and others v. Germany (App No 31098/08, 12 June 2012) para 74,
available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-111532 [accessed 10.07.2019].
15 Case of Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia (Applications No 26261/05 and 26377/
06), available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-117127 [accessed 10.07.2019].
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recruiting new members. The organization was glorifying warfare and Islamic
rule based on the Sharia (religious law). According to the ECtHR, the dissem-
ination of these kinds of political ideas fell within the scope of the Article 17
prohibition.
A very similar line was confirmed in the ECtHR decision in Belkacem v. Belgium.16
In this case the Court declared that the applicant’s claim that he was unjustly
sentenced to a fine and prison was inadmissible. The applicant, the leader and spokes-
person of the organisation Sharia4Belgium, was sentenced for incitement to discrim-
ination, hatred, and violence on account of remarks he made in YouTube
videos concerning non-Muslim groups. In the Court’s view, the hateful
attack was incompatible with the values of tolerance, social peace, and non-
discrimination.17 Moreover, in the Court’s opinion his remarks advocating
jihad and defending Sharia and calling for violence to establish it could be
regarded as “hate speech”.18
In the light of the judgments of international courts as well as the opinions of
a number of legal scholars, incitement to genocide is prohibited. It is prohibited
not only in ICTR judgments but also constitutes an ius cogens norm.19
This approach is supported by the ECHR, which prohibits the abuse of rights
and freedoms. The ECtHR has in several cases admitted that freedom of expres-
sion is not unlimited and that Article 17 provides a reasonable tool for fighting
against the abuse of basic freedoms. The ECtHR has mostly dealt with hate
speech, but referring to argumentum a maiori ad minus has clearly indicated
that incitement to genocide is a form of hate speech and is not protected by the
freedom of expression under the ECHR.
Incitement to genocide and genocide: a causal link
The issue of incitement raises a question regarding causality of the crime.
Should incitement be punishable only when the incited crime took place? This
is of particular importance when we are speaking about social media. Very often,
due to the nature of incitement in cyberspace there is little or no territorial link
with a crime in question. But from the perspective of crime prevention, the
simple fact of incitement should be punished.





18 For more, see Guide on Article 17 of the Convention – Prohibition of Abuse of Rights,
March 2019, available at: www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_17_ENG.pdf [accessed
10.07.2019].
19 More on Report of the International Law Commission Sixty-Sixth Session (5 May–6 June
and 7 July–8 August 2014) (A/69/10) vide Tladi annex, available at: https://legal.un.org/
docs/?path=./ilc/reports/2014/english/annex.pdf&lang=EFSRAC.
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This line of reasoning has been confirmed by international courts prohibiting
public and direct incitement towards genocide. As was pointed out in the
Akayesu case, the incitement to commit genocide should be punished whether
or not it was successful.20 A similar reasoning was confirmed in the Nahimana
case, where the Court ruled that no causal link between the words and the act
was necessary for the crime of incitement to have occurred.21 It underlined that
there is no need for evidence that genocide was committed as a result of the
incitement.22
The legal nature of incitement to genocide was confirmed by the Media Case
Appeals Chamber.23 Incitement crimes are known as “inchoate” offenses. In
other words, the crime is committed when the words are uttered in the proper
context. There need be no results in terms of violence.24 Causation is not an
element of the crime of incitement to genocide.25
Incitement to genocide: direct and public
In order to fulfil the liability requirements of the Genocide Convention one has
to have a specific intent to cause genocide, and the incitement must be direct
and public.26 As regards the term “incitement”, according to the Cambridge
dictionary it means “to encourage someone to do or feel something unpleasant
or violent”.27 The meaning of the term “incitement” was explained in the Kaje-
lijeli judgment as follows:
In the common law jurisdictions, incitement to commit a crime is defined
as encouraging or persuading another to commit the crime, including by
20 Wibke Kristin Timmerman, The Relationship between Hate Propaganda and Incitement to
Genocide: A New Trend in International Law Towards Criminalization of Hate Propaganda?
Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, 2005, p. 267.
21 Ibid., p. 267.
22 Nahimana et. al. (ICTR-99-52-T) in Schabas, p. 181.
23 Shannon Fyfe, Tracking Hate Speech Acts as Incitement to Genocide in International Crim-
inal Law, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 30(2), 2017, p. 538.
24 Elizabeth M. Renieris, Combatting Incitement to Terrorism on the Internet: Comparative
Approaches in the United States and the United Kingdom and the Need for International
Solution, 11 Vand J. Ent. & Tech. L. 673, 682 (2009) (with reference to incitement to terror-
ism); Susan Benesch, Vile Crime or Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide, 48
Va. J. Int’l L. 485, 494 (2008) (with reference to incitement to genocide).
25 For more on that see Gregory S. Gordon, Atrocity Speech Law: Foundation, Fragmentation
Fruition, Oxford University Press, 2017 (noting that causation is not a required element and
specifying that “to make out a prima facie case, the prosecutor need not prove the incitement
resulted in genocide”); and Gregory S. Gordon, “Freedom of Expression, Hate Speech, and
Incitement to Terrorism and Genocide: Resonances and Tensions,” in Anne F. Bayefsky and
Laurie R. Blank (eds), Incitement to Terrorism, Brill Nijhoff, 2018, p. 16.
26 Benesch, p. 493.
27 Collins Cobuild online dictionary https://dictionary.cambridge.org/pl/dictionary/english/
incite.
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use of threats or other forms of pressure, whether or not the crime is actu-
ally committed. […] Civil law systems punish direct and public incitement
assuming the form of provocation, which is defined as an act intended dir-
ectly to provoke another to commit a crime or a misdemeanour through
speeches, shouting or threats, or any other means of audio-visual
communication.28
The meaning of the term “direct and public” was later developed by the inter-
national criminal courts, particularly by the ICTR and ICTY. In the Akayesu
case, the Court stated that:
The ‘direct’ element of incitement implies that the incitement assumes
a direct form and specifically provokes another to engage in a criminal act,
and that more than mere vague or indirect suggestion goes to constitute
direct incitement.29
Furthermore, in the Nyiramasuhuko case the Court stated:
‘Direct’ incitement to commit genocide requires that the speech is
a direct appeal to commit an act referred to in Article 2 (2) of the Stat-
ute. It must be more than a vague or indirect suggestion, and an
accused cannot be held accountable for this crime based on hate speech
that does not directly call for the commission of genocide. However,
even when a speech contains no explicit appeal to commit genocide, it
may still constitute direct incitement to commit genocide in a particular
context, so long as the speech is not considered ambiguous within that
context. In order to determine the speech’s true meaning, it may be
helpful to examine how it was understood by the intended audience. In
the context of Rwanda, the culture and nuances of the Kinyarwanda lan-
guage should be considered when determining what constitutes direct
incitement to commit genocide.30
The public element was deliberated upon in the Kajelijeli case, where the Court
stated that:
28 The Prosecutor v Kajelijeli Judgment, 1 December 2003, para. 850, available at: https://
unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-98-44a/trial-judgements/en/
031201.pdf; see also footnote 1060 of the case and reference to Ashworth, Principles of
Criminal Law, p. 462, cited in Akayesu, Judgment (TC), para. 555.
29 The Prosecutor v Akayesu, Judgment (ICTR-96-4-T) 1998, para. 557, in Schabas, p. 182,
available at: https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-4/
trial-judgments/en/980902.pdf.
30 The Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko et al., Trial Judgment, 24 June 2011, para. 5986,
available at: https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-98-42/
trial-judgments/en/110624.pdf.
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The ‘public’ element of incitement to commit genocide is appreciated by
looking at the circumstances of the incitement – such as where the incite-
ment occurred and whether or not the audience was select or limited. As in
Akayesu the call, for criminal action, to a number of individuals in a public
place or to members of the general public at large by such means as the
mass media, for example radio or television.31
The nature and scope of public incitement was also clarified in the Nyiramasu-
huko case, as follows:
In discussing the ‘public’ element of this crime, the Appeals Chamber
has noted that ‘all convictions before the Tribunal for direct and public
incitement to commit genocide involve speeches made to large, fully
public assemblies, messages disseminated by the media, and communi-
cations made through a public address system over a broad public
area’.
Moreover, the Appeals Chamber has taken into account the travaux prépar-
atoires of the Genocide Convention, which confirm that ‘public’ incitement
to genocide pertains to mass communications. Conversely, the travaux pré-
paratoires indicate that ‘private’ incitement – understood as more subtle
forms of communication such as conversations, private meetings, or mes-
sages – was specifically removed from the Convention.32
This last sentence seems to be of particular importance. Current online com-
munication is often not private or “subtle”; i.e. resulting in “private incite-
ment”. Social media posts, shares, and likes can reach thousands or even
millions of people, not to mention the almost unlimited number of followers
on a platform such as Twitter or Facebook. Seen in this perspective, informa-
tion provided through social media channels can certainly be considered as
“direct and public”.
Incitement to genocide and hate speech
There is a distinction between hate speech and incitement to genocide. This was
noted in the Media Case by the ICTR.33 At the same time, incitement to
31 The Prosecutor v Kajelijeli Judgment, 1 December 2003, para. 850; and The Prosecutor
v Akayesu Judgment 2 September 1998, para. 851, available at: https://unictr.irmct.org/
sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-98-44a/trial-judgments/en/031201.pdf.
32 The Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko et al., Trial Judgment, 24 June 2011, para. 5986,
available at: https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-98-42/
trial-judgements/en/110624.pdf.
33 The Prosecutor v Nahimana et al., ICTR-99-52-A, A Ch (28 November 2007), para 986.
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genocide certainly often overlaps with hate speech. Since the same wording may
be attributed to both forms of offensive language, here I refer to the broadly
discussed Susan Benesch test, proposed in her article “Vile Crime or Inalienable
Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide”. According to Benesch, hate speech
may be considered as an incitement to genocide when:
1 The speech (was) understood by the audience as a call to genocide;
2 The speaker has authority or influence over the audience and the audience
has the capacity to commit genocide.
She also poses additional questions:
3 Have the victims-to-be already suffered an outbreak of recent violence?
4 Were contrasting views still available at the time of the speech? Was it still
safe to express them publicly?
5 Did the speaker describe the victims-to-be as subhuman, or accuse them of
plotting genocide of their own?
6 Had the audience received similar messages before the speech?34
All these elements provide a solid ground to consider certain acts of speech not
only as hate speech, but also – or maybe first and foremost – as incitement to
genocide. However, one comment needs to be made. Benesch’s conditions were
crafted to be applied to the traditional media environment. For this reason some
modifications may be proposed. For example point 2 – “The speaker has author-
ity or influence over the audience and the audience has the capacity to commit
genocide” – is based on the history of popular and influential singer Simon
Bikindi, whose talent, popularity, and recognition were used by the Hutu geno-
cidal enterprise.35 In modern days, especially in the realm of social media, this
issue of authority or influence on the audience may have a different meaning. It
is not necessarily the result of mass popularity of a singer such as Simon Bikindi,
but rather may arise because of a personal individual connection between incitee
and the incitor, who may be someone not influential like Bikindi but known
only as an influencer on a particular forum. All the other Benesch points can be
easily adapted to the reality of the social media environment.
Genocide incitement techniques
Using traditional, conventional words, Shannon Fyfe made several observations
regarding verbal oppression as an example of genocide incitement techniques.36
34 Benesch, p. 498.
35 The Prosecutor v Simon Bikindi, ICTR-01-72-A, available at: https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/
unictr.org/files/cases/ictr-01-72/public-information/en/profile-bikindi.pdf.
36 Fyfe, p. 531.
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Also, Richter points out in a more detailed way different forms of incitement
techniques:
1 Dehumanization – a method used by perpetrators to evoke feelings of loath-
ing, contempt, and revulsion.37
2 Demonization – blaming the target for the perpetrators’ personal misfor-
tunes or those of his/her group and/or provoking feelings of fear towards
a specific group.
3 Delegitimization – denying the existence or history of the other group,
and/or accusing the target of extreme criminal acts.
4 Disinformation – presenting false or partial information with the intent to
malign.
5 Denial – negating historical facts or denying past atrocities.
6 Threats – statements of intent to inflict pain, injury, damage, or other hostile
action on groups or individuals.
7 Glorification38 of terror by invoking well-known perpetrators of genocidal
violence as role models (such as memorializing the “martyrs” or financial
compensation for families of “martyrs” or terrorists).39
Both offenses – incitement to genocide or hate crimes – employ a technique
known as “accusation in a mirror”, which occurs when the perpetrator of the
crime tries to accuse the victims of the very thing that the perpetrator is
doing. This insidious technique was used to great effect in the Rwandan
37 “Dehumanization: After all, what does it take to treat fellow human beings as though they
are not human beings? And the answer is this: dehumanization technique. In genocidal
Rwanda, extremist Hutus routinely dehumanized Tutsis by referring to them in their incite-
ment as snakes, cockroaches, and rats. Similarly, consider Der Stuermer, which was the
viciously anti-Semitic paper edited by Julius Streicher. Based on the content of his newspaper,
Streicher was prosecuted for crimes against humanity and found guilty at Nuremberg. The
Palestinian Authority’s outlets – and even children’s shows and school curricula – have long
called Jews snakes, monkeys, and pigs and called for the annihilation of Israel.” Gordon, Free-
dom of Expression, p. 20.
38 “Glorification […] Both incitement to genocide and terrorism tend to glorify past violence.
For example, glorification of terrorism is currently taking place in the Palestinian Authority
(PA). A recent example would be Jabril Raboul, a PA official, possibly a successor to PA
leader Mahmoud Abbas. In 2015, he called a shooting attack in Beer-sheba that killed two
and injured eleven an act of heroism. This incitement technique has resonances with the
Rwandan Genocide. In addressing the population on Radio Television Libre des Mille Col-
lines, RTLM, the infamous ‘Radio Machete’, announcer Georges Ruggiu congratulated the
‘valiant combatants’ who engaged in a ‘battle’ against innocent Tutsi civilians. This was
a glorification of genocidal violence.” Gordon, Freedom of Expression, p. 18.
39 See Elihu D. Richter, Incitement, Genocide, Genocidal Terror, and the Upstream Role of
Indoctrination: Can Epidemiologic Models Predict and Prevent? Public Health Reviews,
December 2018, p. 14, available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40985-
018-0106-7.
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Genocide.40 For example, in an infamous speech in the lead-up to the Rwan-
dan Genocide, Hutu extremist politician Leon Mugesera declared:
These people called ‘inyenzi’ [which means “cockroaches”, thus also repre-
senting dehumanization] are now on their way to attack us. I am telling
you, and I am not lying, it is they who want to exterminate us. They only
want to exterminate us. They have no other aim. Are we really going to
wait until they come to exterminate us?41
This speech was delivered by a person whose organization was planning geno-
cide. So this is a classic “accusation in a mirror”. This method can easily be dis-
covered in ISIS’s direct and public incitements to genocide, examined below.
Social media activity of ISIS: global and European aspects
There are a number of organizations which use social media for propaganda,
recruitment, fundraising, data mining, and – what is most important – for
indoctrination and incitement to criminal acts.42 Al-Shabaab used Twitter
during its attacks on a shopping mall in Nairobi in 2013. Lashkar-e-Taiba even
coordinated its operation in Mumbai using data from Google Earth and other
apps to hit the most crowded places.43 A number of other examples are also
well known.
There are several ways of exploiting social media to support military object-
ives. Tomas Elkjer Nissen identifies six of them: intelligence collection; (geo-)
targeting; cyber operations; command and control; defence; and psychological
warfare (informing and influencing).44 This chapter analyses the most promin-
ent, the so-called PSYOPS element.
In its psychological warfare ISIS has constructed a “state of the art” social
media presence. It has underlined the notion of “information warfare” on sev-
eral occasions. For example, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, formerly War Minister and
Prime Minister in the Islamic State of Iraq, contended that: “The Messenger of
Allah (peace be upon Him) used to employ the most influential type of media
40 See Kenneth L. Marcus, Accusation in a Mirror, 43 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 357, 358 (2012) (“In
other words, AiM [Accusation in a Mirror] is a rhetorical practice in which one falsely accuses
one’s enemies of conducting, plotting, or desiring to commit precisely the same transgres-
sions that one plans to commit against them.”).
41 Mugesera v. Canada [2005] 2 s.c.R. 100, 2005 scc 40 app. ill, |i8. Cited in Gordon, Freedom
of Expression.
42 Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 70, 2017,
p. 655.
43 James P. Farwell, The Media Strategy of ISIS, Survival, Global Politics and Strategy, Vol.
56(6), 2014.
44 Tomas Elkjer Nissen, Social Media as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare, NATO Strategic Communi-
cations Centre of Excellence, 2016, p. 11, cited in Biały, p. 76.
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in His time that had the greatest impact on the spirits of His enemies, which is
poetry.”45 Using Twitter,46 Facebook, and Snapchat it managed to influence
thousands of followers.47 At the peak of its activity, ISIS and its supporters were
producing 90,000 tweets and other social media responses every day.48 Their
social media activity was linked with so-called anonymous sharing portals such
as JustPaste.it, Sendvid.com, and Dump.to, which protect user anonymity.49
ISIS achieved mastery in publicly presenting its actions, with its heinous acts
meticulously directed, staged, and streamed all around the world.
ISIS used social media to try and achieve several goals. Its strategy was pre-
sented in a document called “Media Operative, You Are a Mujahid, Too”,
which was published online by ISIS in April 2016 on the its official propaganda
channel on the social platform Telegram.50 ISIS directly empowered its follow-
ers, saying “that participant[s] in the production and delivery” of propaganda
should be regarded as one of ISIS’ “media mujahidin”.51 This particular notion
is of great importance. It makes it possible to classify ISIS social media followers
not as bystanders, but as conscious individuals fully aware of their role in the
military and genocidal efforts of ISIS.
There is no doubt that an intentional concept of incitement through social
media was spread by ISIS. Winter quotes Media Operative, which says, “Inciting
others to join the jihad is tantamount to engaging in the jihad oneself, as is
steering others towards it and opening their eyes to it. The one who incites is
a mujahid in the way of Allah the Almighty”.52
Regardless of whether it was fully intentional or not, it certainly created
a grey area of complicity. Especially from the ISIS perspective, the social media
mujahidin operation was highly successful because it blurred the line between
curious onlookers, supporters, and members of ISIS.53
ISIS not only mastered its propaganda, it also created a tailored narrative –
both a positive and negative one. The positive one was oriented toward creating
45 Charlie Winter, Media Jihad: The Islamic State’s Doctrine for Information Warfare, ICSR
King’s College London, available at: https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/
ICSR-Report-Media-Jihad-The-Islamic-State%E2%80%99s-Doctrine-for-Information-War
fare.pdf (12.04.2019), p. 12.
46 Tsesis, p. 655.
47 Joseph Shaheen, Network of Terror: How Daesh Uses Adaptive Social Networks to Spread
its Message, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2015, available at:
www.stratcomcoe.org/network-terror-how-daesh-uses-adaptive-social-networks-spread-its-
message.
48 Ahmad Shehabat and Teodor Mitew, Black-boxing the Black Flag: Anonymous Sharing Plat-
forms and ISIS Content Distribution Tactics, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 12(1),
2018, p. 83.
49 Ibid., p. 81.
50 Winter, p. 8.
51 Ibid., p. 9.
52 Ibid., p. 14.
53 Ibid., p. 9.
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an alternative to the existing status quo.54 Not only did it involve breaking “cru-
saders’” dirty deals, such as the Sykes–Picot agreement or fighting post-colonial
injustice, but also spreading the Truth.55 This positive message was strengthened
by images of ISIS warriors in long lines of Hilux pickups sporting heavy equipment
and weaponry, which were meant to convince jihadists to join the cause. As regards
how successful it was, the numbers speak for themselves – by the end of 2016 ISIS
managed to recruit over 30,000 fighters.56 Thousands of Western European ISIS
followers were encouraged by social media. It is assumed that nearly 5,000 ISIS
fighters were recruited from Europe alone.57 ISIS’s positive narrative was definitely
successful in building support and recruiting new members.58
The negative narrative was much more straightforward. The message was clear:
there is a need to kill all opponents and enemies of holy jihad. Taking into consider-
ation the size of the conquered territory, the mere killing of civilians, journalists, and
opponents59 was not enough. To subdue such a large Iraqi and Syrian territory
required visual manifestations of its gory action, beheadings, and executions. The aim
was clear – intimidation. The same role was played by the corporal punishments,
imposed during public events with the aim to spread terror amongst the civilian
population,60 punishments which were also streamed live through various platforms.
All this – namely propaganda and its own story-telling – was streamed and
published in social media and in traditional media outlets. Media supporting
ISIS were not only located in the Middle East but also in Europe. Media such
as Amaq News Agency, the Al-Bayan radio station, and the Halumu and Nashir
news outlets serve as good examples.61
54 Ibid., p. 15.
55 Opposition to the colonial rule can be found in other sources; for example, a video streamed
by ISIS, “There is No Life Without Jihad”, featuring testimonials from self-identified Britons
and Australians rejecting the current borders of the Middle East as drawn up by the foreign
powers after the First World War. For more on this, see Farwell, p. 50.
56 Thomas Zeitzoff, How Social Media Is Changing Conflict, Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 61(9), 2017, 1970–1991.
57 Radicalisation Awareness Network, Responses to Returnees: Foreign Terrorist Fighters and
Their Families, July 2017, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaf
fairs/files/ran_br_a4_m10_en.pdf p. 6 [accessed 20.10.2019].
58 Farwell, p. 50.
59 Human Rights Council Report, Twenty-Seventh Session on Human Rights Situations That
Require the Council’s Attention (A/HRC/27/CRP.3) on the Syrian Arab Republic, Rule of
Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria, pt. 19. p. 4, available at: www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBo
dies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/HRC_CRP_ISIS_14Nov2014.doc [accessed 20.10.2019].
60 Ibid., p. 4.
61 In 2018, according to a Europol press release, the European Union, Canada and United
States conducted a successful joint operation against the Amaq News Agency media outlet
affiliated with ISIS. The operation was coordinated by the European Union Internet Referral
Unit within the European Counter Terrorism Centre at Europol and involved authorities
from Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Romania, the United Kingdom
and the United States. A seizure of digital evidence and ISIS servers took place on April 25
and 26, which helped identify both the administrators of ISIS websites and “potentially radic-
alized individuals on European soil and beyond”, the agency said. Available at: www.europol.
europa.eu/newsroom/news/islamic-state-propaganda-machine-hit-law-enforcement-in-
coordinated-takedown-action [accessed 29.03.2019].
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A pivotal element hooking ISIS social media and media outlet activities
involved the anonymous sharing portals such as JustPaste.it.62 This platform
activity also garnered broad attention amongst government and intelligence
bodies. It is/was owned by a Polish citizen, Mariusz Żurawek.63 In 2014 ISIS
began using this website to disseminate its online videos, images of beheadings,
and what is particularly important, its digital edition of the ISIS online magazine
Dabiq.64 As Shehabat and Mitew assert, during the site’s peak 70 per cent of its
website content was ISIS.65 So while formally the website was neutral, it was
used to carry out the massive dissemination of ISIS content.
ISIS propaganda as “direct and public” incitement to genocide in
traditional and social media
Nowadays it is rather difficult to distinguish between traditional and social
media. They are highly interconnected. One of the most “popular” propa-
ganda ISIS magazines, Dabiq, was published in PDF format and then dissem-
inated through several information channels and methods. Its popularity was
particularly enhanced using social media platforms. The question to be dis-
cussed here is whether ISIS propaganda and social media activity can or
should be considered as “direct and public” indictment to genocide.
ISIS’s origins can be traced back to Jordanian jihadist Abu Mus’ab al-
Zarqawi. In the late 1990s, he travelled to Afghanistan, where he met the
leaders of al-Qaeda. After the US invasion, al-Zarqawi fled to Iraq, where he
became a well-known jihadist commander. His trademark was attacks against
non-combatants, particularly targeting Shia places of worship.66 Organizations
under the command of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi also continued attacks against
other religious groups, such as the Yazidis. An auger of the future ISIS atti-
tude toward the Yazidis was the joint car bomb attacks which killed nearly 800
Yazidis in northern Iraq in 2007.67 ISIS is/was an organization which identi-
fies with a movement in Islamic political thought known as Jihadi-Salafism.
Adherence to this ideology was explicitly advanced several times; for example,
when ISIS leader Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi appealed “to all Sunnis, and to the
62 O. Wasiuta, S. Wasiuta, P. Mazur, Państwo Islamskie ISIS: nowa twarz ekstremizmu - The
Islamic State ISIS: a new face of extremism, Difin, Warszawa p. 182, 2018.
63 His biography is available at www.linkedin.com/in/zurawek/?originalSubdomain=pl.
64 Shehabat and Mitew, p. 88.
65 Ibid., p. 91.
66 National Center of Excellence for Islamic Studies, University of Melbourne, ISIS (Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria): Origins, Ideology, and Responses by Mainstream Muslim Scholars – A Resource for
Community Leaders, 2016, p. 1, available at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55120ecae4
b01593abadc441/t/58fe89feff7c5003d9acbd86/1493076481168/ISIS_Origins%2C-Ideology
%2C-and-Responses-by-Mainstream-Muslim-Scholars.pdf.
67 Ibid., p. 2.
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young men of Jihadi-Salafism (al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya)”.68 According to
Bunzel, Salafism offers fertile ground for the elimination of different forms of
idolatry (shirk) and affirming God’s Oneness (tawhid). As a part of Salafi
propaganda/beliefs they consider themselves to be the only true Muslims, and
find those who practice a so-called “major idolatry” to be outside Islam. ISIS
was particularly hostile toward Yazidis, as they were perceived to be worship-
ping stones, saints, tombs, etc., and are considered apostates and deserters of
the true religion.69 ISIS’s justification for the persecution of Yazidis was thus
of a religious character.
ISIS ideology was spread through a blend of traditional and social media
comments and also involved the use of video clips and movies. Before Tikrit was
captured in 2014, ISIS released a movie, called New, which was disseminated
both conventionally and unconventionally. Apart from the mass killing of Iraqi
soldiers it also pictures the destruction of Shia mosques and religious objects.70
Direct and public incitement to Yazidi genocide may be found in Dabiq. An
article entitled “The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour”71 fulfilled several of
the above-mentioned Richter categories. The article calls the enemy “Satanist
and devil worshipers”, which constitutes dehumanization (1); delegitimization
(3); and disinformation (4).72 It also contains direct and public threats (6)
against the Yazidis. By stating that “Unlike the Jews and the Christians, there
was no room for the jizyah payment [a tax to be paid to avoid conversion or
death]”, it was calling for the direct killing of Yazidi males, while another para-
graph called for the enslavement of Yazidi females. This call for enslavement and
calling persons spoils of war objectified and dehumanized Yazidi women (1).
After capture, the Yazidi women and children were then divided according
to the Shariah amongst the fighters of the Islamic State who participated in
the Sinjar operations, after one fifth of the slaves were transferred to the
Islamic State’s authority to be divided as khums [spoils of war].73
It is difficult to precisely determine the number of social media tweets, links,
and other data related to the dissemination of propaganda on the various
forums. However, just one website – JustPaste.it – which harboured the full
panoply of ISIS content (from incitement to pictures of hundreds of executions
68 Cole Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State. Brookings
Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World Analysis, Paper No. 19, 2015, p. 7.
69 Bunzel, p. 8.
70 G. Klein, Propaganda Daesh, Akademia Sztuki Wojennej-Academy of National Defence,
Przegląd Strategiczny – Strategic Review 2016 nr 9, Warszawa, p. 187, 2016.
71 Dabiq, The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour, Issue 4, 2014, pp. 14–16, available at
https://clarionproject.org/docs/islamic-state-isis-magazine-Issue-4-the-failed-crusade.pdf
[accessed 03.07.2019].
72 Ibid., p. 14.
73 Ibid., p. 15.
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of Yazidi men and boys) in 2014 had about 2.5 million unique users a month,
which works out to about 6 million sessions every month.74 This clearly made
the ISIS propaganda very public. Furthermore, the ISIS incitement was direct
and the audience grasped the meaning.75
The penalization of ISIS-related incitement
The penalization of incitement refers to the general criminalization concept
based on the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. Genocide, and the prohibition of genocide, have obtained
an ius cogens character. The preventive nature of the prohibition of genocide
requires punishing all the acts foreseen by Article 3 of the Convention.
Penalization of incitement requires a mental element. That is, a person con-
victed of direct and public incitement to commit genocide must have had the
intent to cause the destruction, in whole or in part, of a national, ethnical,
racial, or religious group. This intent fulfils the mens rea requirement of dolus
specialis.76 According to Gordon, in cases of incitement to genocide the mental
element (mens rea) is of a dual nature: the first is the intent to incite, and
the second the intent to commit the genocide itself.77 However, taking into
consideration the already-discussed issue of causation in cases of the crime of
genocide, even incitement without the (personal) intent to commit the genocide
gives grounds for penalization. In this regard the decisive factor is that the
intended recipients of the message belonged to the general public, which
requires an appeal to an indeterminate group of people (a fact that is indisput-
able in the social media and internet environment). As for the mens rea, the per-
petrator must act with the intent to directly and publicly incite others to
commit genocide, which presupposes genocidal intent on his/her part.78
The ICTR held that the crime is inchoate in nature, meaning that it is pun-
ishable even if no act of genocide resulted therefrom. So from the penalization
perspective, a conviction for direct and public incitement to commit genocide
does not require proof of a link between the incitement and any subsequent
crime (a causal link). According to Peterson and Timmermann, this goes
beyond what the drafters of the Genocide Convention could agree on. The
Convention’s travaux préparatoires demonstrate that the initial proposition that
incitement to genocide should be criminalized regardless of whether or not it
74 Carmen Fishwick, How a Polish Student’s Website Became an Isis Propaganda Tool, The
Guardian, August 15, 2014, available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/15/-sp-
polish-man-website-isis-propaganda-tool.
75 Gordon, p. 16.
76 Fyfe, p. 536.
77 Gordon, p. 16.
78 Ines Peterson, International Criminal Liability for Incitement and Hate Speech, in Martin
Böse, Michael Bohlander, André Klip, and Otto Lagodny, Justice Without Borders: Essays in
Honour of Wolfgang Schomburg, Brill/Nijhoff, 2018, p. 337.
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was successful was eventually dropped.79 However, in light of the rulings of
international criminal courts regarding the development and prevention of geno-
cide, this strict approach taken by the Convention drafters no longer holds. Not
to mention that this book is devoted to Raphael Lemkin, the founder of the
concept of genocide. His works had a great impact on the mindset of the Polish
delegation (Juliusz Katz-Suchy, Manfred Lachs, Aleksander Bramnson, and
Aleksander Rudziński). During the Sixth Committee meeting, the Polish delega-
tion insisted that a vital element in incitement is the creation of “an atmosphere
favourable to the perpetration of the crime”.80 And penalization of even an
unsuccessful incitement clearly prevents the creation of such an atmosphere.
This position was surprisingly supported by the Soviets,81 who felt that the
“repression of genocide should include prohibition of incitement to racial
hatred as well as various preparatory or preliminary acts, such as study and
research aimed at developing techniques of genocide”.82
The language of ISIS propaganda is clear. Its very strong wording, calling for
the extermination of Yazidis, leaves little room for reasonable doubts. Such
wording makes it possible to attribute to ISIS the mental element of a culprit,
which is relevant to the requisite mens rea. Article 30 of the International Crim-
inal Court Statute provides that
[f]or the purposes of this article, a person has intent where: (a) In relation
to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; (b) In relation to
a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware
that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. [ … ] For the purposes
of this article, ‘knowledge’ means awareness that a circumstance exists or
a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. ‘Know’ and
‘knowingly’ shall be construed accordingly.83
This fulfils what is known under civil law as dolus directus (the perpetrator
foresees the harmful consequences of the criminal act and wants to bring about
those consequences), and dolus indirectus (the perpetrator foresees certain add-
itional consequences of the criminal act as a likelihood or merely a possibility
and brings about those consequences even though that is not what he wanted
or desired to bring about), with the exception of dolus eventualis.84
79 Ibid., p. 337.
80 Akayesu, supra note 68, para. 557, in Timmerman, p. 269.
81 Taking into consideration the nature and scope of Soviet-era propaganda.
82 William Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes, 2nd edition, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2009, p. 72.
83 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90 (last
amended 2010).
84 Johan Van der Vyver, The International Criminal Court and the Concept of Mens Rea in
International Criminal Law, University of Miami International & Comparative Law Review,
Vol. 12, 2004, pp. 63–64, Emory Public Law Research Paper.
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These words cover the situation, as noted by the ICTR in Nahimana, where
explicit calls for violence were made by the accused, as members of the Coalition
pour la Defense de la Republique (CDR) were chanting “tubatsembatsembe” (or
“let’s exterminate them”).85 Thus the similar appeals made by ISIS should not
only be prohibited, but also criminalized.
Other social media activity: copy-pasting, sharing, or liking as a
form of incitement
Posting by a user means creating a story, making a comment, linking a content,
or simply putting a picture online. Usually, the legal status of the post is similar
amongst different social media platforms. The social media user is the owner of
the content (he/she can remove it at will). From the criminal law point of view,
the posting of specific content is attributable to the physical person. Unless
a post is posted by computers or bots, this requires a mental element which can
be further penalized. Amongst volunteers joining ISIS there were a significant
number of females (around 550). Many unsuccessful ISIS brides were caught
because of posting their willingness to make hijra86 on their social media
accounts.87
All forms of communicating via social media seem to satisfy the mental elem-
ent of the crime, whether it is sharing, liking, or following. In all these forms
the user publicly announces his or her views or beliefs. Liking ISIS content that
will be visible to an unspecified group of people is very public. Not only so-
called Facebook friends, but also the poster’s friends’ friends can see his likes,
comment on them, or share them. This basically means that content containing
a hateful comment or an incitement to genocide is broadcast to the public in
a way which is not much different from, for example, radio or TV. Thus such
action satisfies the requirements of public and direct action as foreseen by Article
2 of the Genocide Convention.
Naturally the question of criminal responsibility of the social media platforms
themselves as an accomplice to genocide is also very interesting. However, it is
beyond the scope of this chapter.
These forms of sharing views can be analysed using the already-mentioned
Benesch test. It is possible to imagine that a person of great influence – a Simon
Bikindi-type personality – shares or likes posts or movies with a genocidal
85 Timmerman, p. 269.
86 “Hijra” is an Arabic word meaning “emigration”, evoking the Prophet Muhammad’s escape
from Mecca to Medina. Abdullah Azzam defined “hijra” as departing from a land of fear to
a land of safety, a definition he later amplified to include the act of leaving one’s land and
family to take up jihad in the name of establishing an “Islamic State”. For more on it see
Anita Perešin, Fatal Attraction: Western Muslimas and ISIS, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol.
9(3), 2015, p. 34, Footnote 4, SN 2334–3745, available at: www.researchgate.net/publica
tion/301748250_Fatal_Attraction_Western_Muslimas_and_ISIS.
87 Perešin, p. 22.
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content. In such a scenario it would seem to be reasonable to consider such
actions as an intentional form of incitement to genocide, punishable under inter-
national and/or domestic law.
Currently, instead of a person of great influence we simply have influencers.
This category of persons mirrors the category recognized by the ICTR. As
a result, in my opinion a person does not need to be particularly famous (i.e.
a Simon Bikindi type of popularity). It is enough if he or she has an impact on
the lives of followers. In such a case one may be not only an internet mujahidin,
but also an inciter to genocide, and as such responsible for violation of the
1948 Genocide Convention.
Conclusions
While it is obvious that the world has changed, in the realm of communication we
are facing a real revolution. A vital element of this revolution is social media, which
was born out of the desire for free and undisturbed communication. However, the
lack of control over social media has become its greatest sin. Persons who operate
without any real control create space for hate speech and other forms of lawlessness.
The lack of a truly efficient means of legal procedure against lawbreakers has created
unprecedented safe havens for any person who wishes to use social media not as
a peaceful Mr Jekyll in Hyde Park but as nasty Mr Hyde.
There are, however, legal means to prosecute incitement to genocide committed
on social media, or more generally in cyberspace. As was discussed above, incite-
ment on the internet may fulfil all the requirements provided by the Genocide Con-
vention, relevant treaties, and customary law. The major challenges are still the
uncontrolled nature of Facebook and other social media platforms. The complex
jurisdictional issues, combined with a lack of domestic regulation of social media,
result in unprecedented impunity. However, the existing domestic legal mechan-
isms may, with the support of universal jurisdiction, provide a solution.
Incitement with the use of social media will be most likely a growing phe-
nomenon. There is a definite need for stricter policies. There is a need to pro-
vide a relevant, cross-culture-sensitive protection, based on local legal regimes,
in order to protect against incitement to genocide. Pressure has to be put on
communication platform operators worldwide, such as Facebook or Twitter, and
local ones such as JustPaste.it. A lack of efficient prevention may lead to further
degeneration of freedom of speech (and its limits). Subsequently genocides may
be sparked and orchestrated using social media.
As author I have made all efforts to prove in this chapter that all the elements
of incitement to genocide, such as incitement per se, direct and public, and with
a special intent may be fulfilled in cases of inciting genocide by using the social
media realm.
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